A central theme in behavioral economics focuses on experimental evidence that individuals learn from the choice problems they face and consequently violate the consistency requirements of revealed preference theory. Despite the experimental evidence, the testable implications of such contextual inference remain unclear. In particular, it is an open question if learning from the choice problem imposes any restrictions on observed behavior. Motivated by the Sha…r and Tversky [18] experiments, this paper models contextual inference in the framework of preference for ‡exibility introduced by Kreps [10] and extended by Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [4]. Within this framework, the paper proposes a relaxation of the weak axiom which formalizes the identi…cation strategy in Sha…r and Tversky [18] . A subjective state space that may depend on the subset of actions faced by the individual is uniquely identi…ed from behavior, and local preferences are partially recovered.
Introduction

Objectives
Luce and Rai¤a's Dinner [11, p.288 ] provides a prominent example of an agent who learns from the choice problem she faces. A customer orders chicken when the restaurant o¤ers chicken and steak, but chooses steak when frog legs are added to the menu. The customer is not irrational: the presence of an exquisite dish (frog legs) changes her perception of the quality of food served at the restaurant. When quality is perceived to be high, the customer orders steak; otherwise she chooses the safer option (chicken). In this example, 'irrelevant' alternatives do matter as they provide information about the uncertainty an agent considers relevant to her choice.
Adding alternatives may also suggest contingencies the agent did not conceive of prior to their inclusion. Sen [15, 16] describes the following thought experiment. Jack comes back to town and asks his friend Jill to join him for co¤ee. Facing the alternative of staying at home, Jill gladly accepts the invitation. But when Jack o¤ers co¤ee versus a shot of cocaine at his hotel room, the host of possibilities spurred by the o¤er of cocaine sway Jill to stay at home. As in the previous example, Sen attributes the violation of the weak axiom to the informational content of the choice problem or its epistemic value, and argues that a fully rational agent would often infer the possible states of the world by examining what choices are being o¤ered to her.
What are the testable implications of such rational inference? Can a theory of revealed preference distinguish inference from arbitrary behavior? In the abstract choice setting, Sen [15, 16] gives a negative answer and argues that there is an "inescapable need to go beyond the internal features of a choice function to understand its cogency and consistency". This paper provides an a¢ rmative answer by retaining the revealed preference approach while specializing the abstract choice setting.
The abstract setting is restrictive for two reasons. One challenge, as Sen points out, arises when each choice problem induces a di¤erent perception of uncertainty. In that case, behavior exhibits no evident consistency across problems making the distinction between arbitrary behavior and rational inference impossible. The second di¢ culty precedes the question of consistency. In the abstract setting, the act of choice does not by itself reveal if the agent faces uncertainty at the time of choice. A customer who selects chicken over steak might be perfectly con…dent in her enjoyment of the dish or completely unsure of the quality of food being served. This problem is …rst addressed by Kreps'work [10] on preference for ‡exibility. Kreps'seminal idea is that an agent's desire to defer the choice of action reveals her perception of uncertainty. To model choice deferral, he postulates a preference ordering over menus or subsets of actions. By choosing a menu, the agent e¤ectively defers her choice of action until uncertainty resolves at a later (unmodeled) stage.
This paper characterizes rational inference in the richer framework of preference for ‡exibility. To illustrate the main argument, imagine Jill's choice problem when Jack does not o¤er cocaine. Suppose Jill had the possibility to defer choice. As Jill sees no reason to stay at home, the added ‡exibil-ity would be of no value to her. Conversely, Jill's indi¤erence to the added ‡exibility would reveal that the actions home and co¤ee alone induce no uncertainty in her mind. In the formal framework, having the option to defer choice leads to a new and distinct choice problem which nonetheless retains the same basic actions (home and co¤ee) and therefore the same epistemic content as Jill's original problem without deferral. In other words, we can construct a collection of epistemically equivalent problems by simply varying the possibility to defer choice while keeping the subset of basic actions …xed. Is this collection of epistemically equivalent problems rich enough to reveal a unique preference ordering and pin down Jill's perception of uncertainty?
Standard uniqueness results in the theory of revealed preference depend crucially on behavior being coherent across all choice problems. Sen's example suggests that such global coherence is restrictive when behavior exhibits rational inference. The objective of this paper is to weaken global coherence and investigate formally the extent to which a modeler who observes choice deferral can recover the agent's local preference and her perception of uncertainty within each subcollection of epistemically equivalent problems.
Sha…r and Tversky [18] employ choice deferral to test experimentally how di¤erent subsets of actions in ‡uence agents'perception of uncertainty. In Sha…r, Simonson, and Tversky [17] , they use the evidence to substantiate the concept of rational inference. The identi…cation strategy in these experiments motivates closely the present construction of epistemically equivalent problems. The construction is based on Kreps'framework for modeling choice deferral and enables a revealed preference analysis of the experimental evidence.
As in Sen's cocaine example, Sha…r and Tversky [18] …nd that the inclusion of new alternatives often increases the likelihood of choice deferral.
The interpretation of the evidence is that new alternatives lead subjects to conceive of new contingencies. In the formal model of this paper, such behavior implies that subjective state spaces are nested: each state induced by a given subset of actions corresponds to an event in the state space induced by larger problems. This result parallels recent epistemic models of unawareness. In particular, the syntactic construction of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper [8] identi…es an agent's awareness with a subset of a given language. The set of sublanguages in turn induces a lattice of nested state spaces. This paper provides a behavioral analogue of their construction, where each subset of actions faced by the agent shapes her awareness of relevant contingencies.
Formal Framework
To model choice deferral, the paper adopts the Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [4] framework of preference for ‡exibility, which extends Kreps' work by modeling choice between sets of lotteries. Thus let Z = fz 1 ; :::z K g denote a …nite set of actions and let Z be the set of lotteries over Z endowed with the Euclidean metric. A generic lottery is denoted by 2 Z. For an arbitrary metric space X, de…ne K(X) as the set of nonempty closed subsets endowed with the Hausdor¤ metric. Thus x 2 K( Z) is a menu or a generic subset of actions and constitutes an object of choice, whereas A 2 K(K( Z)) is a collection of menus or a choice problem. The primitive of the model is a choice correspondence c : K(K( Z)) K( Z) such that:
When the agent chooses a menu x 2 c(A), she e¤ectively defers her choice of action (lottery) 2 x until after the uncertainty she perceives is resolved. This timeline is sketched below:
The agent is forward-looking and her ex ante choice c(A) re ‡ects, and under suitable conditions, reveals her perception of relevant contingencies.
The Sha…r-Tversky Experiments
In the Sha…r and Tversky [18] experiments, subjects can choose either of two actions z; z 0 or they can defer choice. In the above framework, the possibility to defer choice is formally modeled by the menu fz; z 0 g. Sha…r and Tversky [18] …nd that the inclusion of a new alternative z 00 may increase the likelihood of deferring choice or, equivalently, of choosing the menu fz; z 0 g. The interpretation is that the new alternative z 00 leads the agent to conceive of new contingencies and so to defer her decision until after uncertainty is resolved. If one takes z 00 to be cocaine, the behavior observed by Sha…r and Tversky [18] can be illustrated in terms of Sen's example:
The …rst problem corresponds to Jill's original decision after the o¤er of cocaine. In the second, Jill faces the same actions, but has, in addition, the ‡exibility to defer her decision between home and co¤ee. In the interim, she might seek the advice of a friend and try to learn more about Jack. Thus Jill's desire to defer choice reveals her uncertainty between the states 'good Jack', in which case she would accept the invitation for co¤ee, and 'bad Jack' when she would stay at home.
Compare (1.1) with Jill's behavior in the absence of cocaine. As Sen argues, the possibility of 'bad Jack'is induced by the o¤er of cocaine. In its absence, Jill foresees no contingencies when staying at home is preferable. Consequently, she is indi¤erent to having the ‡exibility of postponing her decision:
2) c{{home}, {co¤ee}, {home, co¤ee}} = {{home, co¤ee}, {co¤ee}} Examples (1.1) and (1.2) illustrate the identi…cation strategy in the Sha…r and Tversky [18] experiments. By keeping the subset of basic actions …xed and simply adding the possibility to defer choice, one generates a subcollection of problems having the same informational content. Within any such collection, a fully rational agent would satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference. De…nition 1 in this paper provides a formal construction of epistemically equivalent problems. Then Theorem 4 shows that the modeler can recover a preference ordering within each such collection. This local preference is unique in a strong albeit limited sense. To see why uniqueness may fail in general, suppose that in (1.1), Jack o¤ered co¤ee, cocaine and going to the movies:
Since the o¤er of cocaine sways Jill to stay at home, the modeler can never observe Jill's ranking between having co¤ee and going to the movies conditional on the o¤er of cocaine. In the presence of cocaine, neither of the alternatives is ever chosen. Theorem 4 shows that this example is in fact tight: the ranking of alternatives that are chosen in at least one problem of the collection is unique. Despite the partial recoverability of local preferences, the paper shows that Jill's perception of uncertainty or the states of the world she foresees can be fully identi…ed from behavior. To see why this is the case, imagine the following example:
c{{home}, { cocaine}, {co¤ee}} = {co¤ee} Jill can stay at home, o¤er co¤ee at her place or go out with Jack. Jack's prior dates have resulted either in taking cocaine or having co¤ee. Two scenarios with di¤erent dating histories are depicted above. In both, the presence of cocaine induces the states 'good Jack, bad Jack', but Jill's beliefs are likely to be correlated with the relative frequency of cocaine: She o¤ers co¤ee when cocaine is the exception, but stays at home when cocaine is the rule. In other words, the two choice problems are epistemically di¤erent yet they induce the same perception of relevant contingencies. Based on the joint data of such collections, Theorem 1 recovers the state space uniquely even when local preferences change depending on the relative frequency of cocaine. This identi…cation requires that the state space be de…ned directly in terms of behavior and independently of local preferences.
The intuitive appeal of example (1.4) depends crucially on the interpretation of the objective lottery as the relevant history of prior dates. In many economic settings, objective lotteries arise when the decision maker randomizes on her own or simply conceptualizes the set of possible lotteries. In such settings, objective lotteries have no epistemic content beyond the deterministic actions in their support. Under this assumption, a fully rational agent would satisfy the weak axiom across all problems with the same support. Then Theorem 5 recovers a local preference which is unique in the class of all continuous preferences. The restriction to continuous preferences is essential since continuity is used to 'approximate'and pin down Jill's ranking across alternatives that are never chosen, such as co¤ee and going to the movies in example (1.3).
Local State Spaces
A Model of Rational Inference
This section describes the formal model of rational inference. First, the collections of epistemically equivalent problems are constructed based on the identi…cation strategy in the Sha…r and Tversky [18] experiments. Behavior is assumed to be coherent within each such collection. Second, the notion of a local state space is de…ned. As suggested by example (1.4), the de…nition is stated directly in terms of choice behavior and independently of local preferences. This separation facilitates the identi…cation of the local state space which is more general than, and logically precedes, the notion of local preference.
Say that a choice problem B provides more ‡exibility than A, and write
x i g and x i 2 A for all i = 1; :::; m. If there exists a …nite sequence B 1 ; :::; B n such that B = B n and B n B B n 1 :::B 1 B A, write B B n A and de…ne the collection A := fB : B B n A; n 2 Ng. Choice problems in A retain the same basic actions as problem A but provide more ‡exibility to defer choice. Thus the collection A consists of epistemically equivalent problems and the following de…nition requires that behavior is coherent within A .
De…nition 1
The choice correspondence c is weakly locally rationalizable if it is rationalizable on every collection of epistemically equivalent prob-
Weak local rationalizability ensures that violations of the weak axiom arise only in response to changes in the underlying actions or the probability distribution over actions. This requirement captures a notion of local coherency and underlies the experiments conducted by Sha…r and Tversky [18] .
For any nonempty, nonsingleton subset of actions Z 0 Z, let Z 0 denote the collection of all choice problems supported by the subset Z 0 . The support of a choice problem A or simply supp(A) is the subset of deterministic actions which receive strictly positive probability for at least one lottery in some menu in A. Choice problems in Z 0 retain the same deterministic actions in their support and, as example (1.4) suggests, they induce the same perception of uncertainty. To de…ne the local state space induced by Z 0 , let P Z 0 be the set of all nondegenerate von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) preferences over Z 0 , and let S Z 0 R jZ 0 j be a corresponding collection of vNM indices such that the mapping P : S Z 0 ! P Z 0 is one-to-one and onto. A local state space is a subset P Z 0 of P Z 0 . Each state or vNM preference in P Z 0 characterizes the agent's ex post behavior, or her choice from the menu, conditional on some resolution of her subjective uncertainty.
The next de…nition summarizes the behavioral implications of a local state space. Notationally, it is convenient to state the de…nition in terms of a subset of vNM indices S Z 0 S Z 0 . The de…nition does not depend on the particular normalization and both S Z 0 and its image P Z 0 := P (S Z 0 ) will be used interchangeably to mean a local state space. (ii) Dominance: If max 2x s max 2y s for every s 2 S Z 0 , with strict inequality for some s, then:
Su¢ ciency requires that the state space S Z 0 be large enough to encompass all contingencies foreseen by the agent. Consequently, any two menus that achieve the same ex post payo¤s are revealed indi¤erent. In contrast, Dominance requires that the state space S Z 0 be small in the sense of including only states that are behaviorally relevant. Together, Su¢ ciency and Dominance determine the agent's subjective perception of uncertainty as revealed by her choice behavior.
To illustrate the de…nition, recall Jill's desire to defer her choice between home and co¤ee as in (1.1). By Su¢ ciency, S {home, co¤ee, cocaine} includes at least two payo¤ functions: one for the state when co¤ee is an optimal choice and another when home is preferred. In contrast, Dominance and the indifference between {co¤ee} and {home, co¤ee} in example (1.2) require that S {home, co¤ee} excludes any state in which staying at home is optimal. Prior to the o¤er of cocaine, such contingencies are simply not relevant for Jill's behavior.
Jointly, weak local rationalizability and the existence of local state spaces provide a formal framework for modeling rational inference.
Axiomatic Framework
In the theory of choice, the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) is the standard requirement of coherent or rational behavior. The axiom, see Arrow [3] , takes the following form:
WARP: For all choice problems A and B such that A B:
The weak axiom requires that an alternative y cannot be revealed strictly preferred to x if x has been revealed preferred to y in another choice problem. The following axiom preserves the substantive content of the weak axiom, but applies it only to some choice problems.
To illustrate, consider a problem A and any two alternatives x; y 2 A. Adding the union of x and y to the choice problem A keeps the set of basic actions …xed and enables the agent to defer choice between x and y. Consequently, the agent is contemplating the same set of actions but is less constrained to make the choice ex ante, that is, prior to the resolution of any contingencies she foresees. As no new information is obtained, the agent's behavior is coherent:
Weak Consistency: For any choice problems A and menus x; y 2 A, let
Weak Consistency ensures that violations of the weak axiom arise only in response to changes in the underlying lotteries or actions. One such response is illustrated in example (1.4). There Jill's perception of uncertainty is determined by the support of the choice problem, but her beliefs are revised depending on the probability of cocaine. To characterize Jill's local state space, it is necessary to isolate behavior that depends only on Jill's conceptualization of what might happen, but not on her beliefs. To this purpose, consider any menus x and y such that y x and observe that Jill reveals a strict preference for x if and only if she perceives a contingency that makes the ‡exibility provided by x valuable. This argument plays a key role in the next axiom.
To state the axiom, de…ne the mixture x + (1 )x 0 of two menus x; x 0 2 K( Z) for some real number 2 [0; 1] as follows:
Observe that x y implies x + (1 )x 0 y + (1 )x 0 for all menus x 0 . Suppose then that x y is revealed strictly preferred to y in some choice problem A. This choice reveals that the agent perceives a contingency in which some action 2 xny is strictly more desirable than any 2 y. But if that same contingency obtains, an agent who satis…es vNM independence would …nd the lottery + (1 ) 0 strictly preferable to + (1 ) 0 for any 2 y and 0 . Ex ante, a forward-looking agent should therefore prefer the ‡exibility provided by x + (1 )x 0 over y + (1 )x 0 in any choice problem that induces the same perception of uncertainty. Intuitively, these are choice problems having the same support:
Weak Independence: For all choice problems A; B with supp(A) = supp(B), all menus x; y; x 0 ; x 00 with x y and ; 0 2 (0; 1]:
The next axiom ensures that ‡exibility is always weakly preferable.
Monotonicity: For any choice problem A and menus x; y 2 A such that x y:
The …nal axioms impose a weak continuity requirement and a standard nontriviality assumption. Weak continuity ensures that perturbing the menus slightly without changing the subset of actions in their support does not drastically alter the agent's preference for ‡exibility.
Weak Continuity: For any sequence A n := fx n ; y n g converging to A := fx; yg such that 8n supp(A n ) =supp(A) and x n y n :
Nontriviality: For any nonsingleton, nonempty subset Z 0 of Z, there exists a choice problem A such that supp(A) = Z 0 and c(A) 6 = A.
The next theorem shows that the above axioms characterize fully the model of rational inference.
Theorem 1
The choice correspondence c satis…es Weak Consistency, Weak Independence, Monotonicity, Weak Continuity and Nontriviality if and only if c is weakly locally rationalizable and has a local state space
Remark 1 If P Z 0 is a local state space then so is its closure cl(P Z 0 ). In view of the uniqueness result in Theorem 1, refer to a local state space as the closed set of preferences satisfying De…nition 2.
When behavior is coherent across all choice problems and so rationalizable by a single preference ordering, Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [4] characterize a strictly weaker notion of a subjective state space. Formally, they de…ne a subjective state space to be the smallest set of vNM preferences for which Su¢ ciency obtains. Without the assumption of global rationalizability, this de…nition becomes less tractable and too general for a model of rational inference. Speci…cally, it allows behavior that exhibits a strict preference for the menu {home, co¤ee} over {co¤ee} in some problem with support {home, co¤ee, cocaine} and the reverse preference in another problem having the same support. Such reversals make it impossible to isolate the e¤ect of introducing {cocaine} on the agent's perception of uncertainty and are ruled out by the present de…nition.
Small Worlds
The o¤er of cocaine leads Jill to think of new contingencies. They re…ne her understanding of the world and of the possible implications her actions might have. The next axiom requires that larger supports induce a richer perception of uncertainty and thereby a greater demand for ‡exibility:
Nestedness: For all choice problems A; B such that supp(A) supp(B); all menus x; y; x 0 with x y and 2 (0; 1]:
[x 2 c(A) and y 2 Anc(A)] implies
The formulation of Nestedness and its interpretation are analogous to Weak Independence. The rest of this section addresses its implications in terms of how state spaces re ‡ect an agent's increased awareness of uncertainty.
In his seminal work on subjective probability, Savage [13, p. 83] alludes to the practical necessity that the relevant state space depend on the isolated decision problem, and at best, approximate an idealized universal state space. Consequently, he postulates a 'small world'that is a partition of the universal state space or 'the grand world'. Each small state constitutes an event in the grand world or an incomplete resolution of uncertainty. This formulation is substantiated in the recent work of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper [8] who construct a canonical model of knowledge and awareness. In their syntactic framework, the agent's awareness is identi…ed with a subset of a universal language. The set of sublanguages in turn induces a lattice of nested state spaces -each state described by some language corresponds to an event in the state space of a richer language.
The next theorem provides a behavioral analogue of their construction where the support of each choice problem shapes the agent's awareness of relevant contingencies. To illustrate, take Jill's initial preference for co¤ee over staying at home. Following the o¤er of cocaine, this preference is still a contingency that may eventuate but need no longer exhaust, or resolve, all uncertainty. More formally, let Z 0 ; Z 00 be nonempty, nonsingleton subsets of actions such that Z 0 Z 00 and let t Z 00 Z 0 : R Z 00 ! R Z 0 denote the restriction of each preference pro…le in R Z 00 to the set of lotteries Z 0 . The theorem shows that each state % in the subjective state space P Z 0 corresponds to the nonempty event (t
Recovery of Local Preferences
This section investigates the uniqueness of local preferences. A central result in revealed preference theory is the following theorem due to Arrow [3] :
Theorem 3 (Arrow [3] ) If a collection includes all choice problems of up to three alternatives, then the choice correspondence c satis…es WARP if and only if it is rationalizable. The preference relation % that rationalizes c is unique.
It is evident from examples (1.1) and (1.2) that collections of epistemically equivalent problems in general fail Arrow's condition. In (1.1), the modeler tries to infer Jill's local preference over the actions {home}, {co¤ee} and {cocaine}, yet the binary problem {{home}, {co¤ee}} is epistemically di¤erent. Its inclusion to the collection of problems in (1.1) leads to a violation of the weak axiom. It is important to recognize that this failure of Arrow's condition jeopardizes both the existence and uniqueness of a rationalizing preference relation. The problem of existence is fully resolved by Richter [12] . He identi…es a requirement stronger than the weak axiom whereby a choice correspondence c is rationalizable on any collection . At the same time, the generality of Richter's nonconstructive approach provides no answer to the problem of uniqueness. Intuitively, uniqueness depends on the speci…c structure and richness of the collection . The next theorem identi…es a broad class of collections which includes the collections of epistemically equivalent problems A and admits both a constructive approach to preference and a suitably de…ned uniqueness property.
To state the theorem, de…ne c( ) := [ A2 c(A) to be the range of the choice correspondence c, that is, the set of alternatives chosen within some collection of problems . Theorem 4 shows that within each collection of epistemically equivalent problems the modeler can recover a local preference which is unique when restricted to the set of chosen alternatives c( ). Notice that if all binary problems are observable as in Arrow's theorem, then the range c( ) includes the whole set of feasible alternatives (except for possibly one) and behavior is uniquely rationalizable.
In general, the range c( ) is a proper subset of all alternatives within . In example (1.3), the actions {co¤ee} and {movies} are never chosen by Jill and their ranking conditional on the o¤er of cocaine cannot be inferred from behavior. Thus the partial recoverability in Theorem 4 is in general binding for a model of rational inference.
A Special Case: Only Supports Matter
The rest of this section studies the special case when objective lotteries have no epistemic content beyond the deterministic actions in their support. While violated in example (1.4), this assumption is satis…ed in many economic settings in which the decision maker randomizes on her own or simply conceptualizes the set of possible lotteries. In experiments, the modeler can also utilize an extraneous randomization device which has no epistemic content. In these cases, the question becomes: Can we perturb slightly the probabilities of unchosen actions and …nd nearby lotteries whose ranking is observable? Put di¤erently, can we extend by continuity the unique ranking on c( ) to all alternatives within ?
Before answering the question, let us formalize the stronger restrictions on behavior. The following axioms require that behavior is coherent and also continuous within each collection of problems having the same support. These requirements capture the fact that only supports have informational content. Continuity: For any sequence of choice problems A n converging to A such that 8n supp(A n ) =supp(A) and y n 2 c(A n ):
y n ! y implies y 2 c(A).
In general, the continuous or topological extension of a preference ordering need not preserve transitivity. Intuitively, transitivity fails when di¤erent pairs of nearby alternatives have di¤erent rankings making the extension of preference di¢ cult. Under the above axioms, Monotonicity and Weak Independence, this di¢ culty is overcome: there exists a transitive and continuous extension which rationalizes behavior. Moreover, it is unique in the class of all continuous preferences. Notice that this result is still weaker than Arrow [3] . Other preference relations may rationalize behavior but by the next theorem they must necessarily be discontinuous. The preference relation % Z 0 is unique in the class of all continuous, complete and transitive relations that rationalize c on Z 0 .
Remark 2
The unique continuous preference % Z 0 inherits the local state space S Z 0 . That is, S Z 0 is the subjective state space of % Z 0 in the sense of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [4] .
Related Literature
Motivated by Luce and Rai¤a's dinner, Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler [9] explore the rationalization of a choice function by multiple preferences. The authors observe that any choice function can be rationalized by some collection of preferences and measure the meaningfulness of that method by the minimal number of orderings su¢ cient to explain behavior. As they show however, many 'rational'choice procedures do not admit a small number of orderings. Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler [9, p. 2487] conclude that the appeal of a certain collection of local preferences "does not emanate only from its small number of orderings, but also from the simplicity of describing in which cases each one of them is applied"and "more research is needed to de…ne and investigate 'structured'forms of rationalization". In this paper, the necessary structure is provided by the framework of preference for ‡exibility. It allows us to model formally the possibility to defer choice as utilized in the Sha…r and Tversky [18] experiments. Rather than minimality, the paper emphasizes the uniqueness of local preferences as determinants of choice.
In recent papers, Green and Hojman [7] and Ambrus and Rozen [2] use multi-selves or mutli-criteria models in order to accommodate violations of the weak axiom documented in experimental work. In the language of this paper, multiple selves correspond to possible states of the world. However, both Green and Hojman [7] and Ambrus and Rozen [2] operate in the abstract domain of choice and admit all possible choice correspondences. The cost of such generality is that models are not identi…ed. In contrast, this paper shows that models of rational inference are both testable and identi…able in the richer framework of preference for ‡exibility. 
Identify each x 2 X with its support function x : S Z 0 !R de…ned by:
Note that C := f x : x 2 X g is a convex subset of C(S Z 0 ), the space of continuous functions on S Z 0 . Endow C(S Z 0 ) with the sup-norm jjf jj := supfjf (s)j : s 2 S Z 0 g and the pointwise order: f g if and only if f (s)
The following lemmas summarize results obtained in [4, 5] :
The mapping x 7 ! x is an isometry from X to C such that:
) there exists a menu x 2 X such that x c. In particular, the function that is identically zero on S Z 0 lies in C i.e. 0 2 C C(S Z 0 ).
Lemma 2
The set H := f ( 0 ) : 0; ; 0 2 Cg is a vector sublattice of C(S Z 0 ).
The Set of vNM Preferences
For any subset of actions Z 0 2 D, let R Z 0 denote the set of vNM preferences over Z 0 endowed with the quotient topology, i.e., the strongest topology such that the mapping P : R jZ 0 j ! R Z 0 is continuous. The quotient topology on R Z 0 is used by Dhillon and Mertens [6] and as they remark a subbase is given by the collection ff%: 0 g : ; 0 2 Z 0 g. One feature of the quotient topology is that it is not Hausdor¤: R Z 0 is the only open neighborhood of the degenerate preference % 0 (complete indi¤erence). On the other hand, P Z 0 := R Z 0 nf% 0 g with its relative topology is homeomorphic to S Z 0 and therefore a compact, Hausdor¤ space. This delivers the following lemma. Z 0 : R Z 00 ! R Z 0 denote the projection that maps a preference in R Z 00 into its induced preference in R Z 0 , Then:
Z 0 is continuous; (ii) If F P Z 00 is relatively closed in P Z 00 , then t
Proof: (i) Take a basic set U = f%2 R Z 0 : k 0 k for k = 1; :::; ng. By construction:
is basic in the quotient topology on R Z 00 proving the continuity of t
To prove (ii), let f% n g be a sequence in t Z 00 Z 0 (F )\P Z 0 converging to %2 P Z 0 in the relative topology. Take any sequence f% 0 n g such that: % 0 n 2 (t
Since F P Z 00 is relatively closed and P Z 00 is compact, f% 0 n g has a subsequence converging to % 0 2 F . By continuity, %= t
As in Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [4] , the closure of a local state space P Z 0 is de…ned in terms of the relative topology on P Z 0 .
Proof of Theorem 1
Necessity of the axioms follows from the properties of support functions obtained in Lemma 1. To prove su¢ ciency, …x some Z 0 2 D and de…ne:
De…ne the possibly incomplete relation % on K := fx 2 K( Z) : supp(x) = Z 0 g as follows:
x % y if and only if 9A 2 Z 0 s.t. x [ y 2 A and x 2 c(A):
Extend % by letting (x; x) 2% for all x such that supp(x) = Z 0 . Let and denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of %, respectively. The following lemmas summarize some useful properties of %. 
Proof: The …rst two properties follow easily from the de…nition of %. To see (iii), take x % y and note that:
The indi¤erence follows from Weak Independence and the fact that To see (iv), let:
By Monotonicity,
x [ x 0 2 c(A). Then Weak Independence implies that:
Applying Monotonicity again:
Weak Independence and equations (6.4), (6.5) imply: and so x % x 0 .
Fix some such that supp( ) = Z 0 and for every x; y 2 K(
x % y if and only if
By Weak Independence the extension is well-de…ned. Furthermore, the extended % is a preorder that satis…es Independence (6.2). By Weak Continuity, % is also closed in the product topology on K( Z 0 ) K( Z 0 ) and so a continuous a¢ ne preorder.
The construction of % is inspired by Kreps'notion of a dominance relation whose main feature is given by property (ii) in Lemma 4:
x % y if and only if x x [ y.
The dominance relation % summarizes the part of agent's behavior that pertains only to her perception of contingencies but not to her beliefs. Lemmas (5-7) stated next establish this formally. The lemmas show that there exists a bijection between the set of continuous a¢ ne preorders on K( Z 0 ) that satisfy property (ii) above and the set K(S Z 0 ) of possible state spaces. The proof proceeds by identifying the preorder % with its cone D in the linear space H = f ( 0 ) : 0; ; 0 2 Cg. Property (ii) then implies that the dual cone of D equals the set of probability measures on some closed subset of S Z 0 .
First, use [5, Lemma S6] to show that for any menu x, x conv(x). By Lemma 1, % de…nes a continuous a¢ ne preorder on C = f x : x 2 X g. De…ne the cone of % as:
Let L denote a generic linear functional on H and de…ne the dual cone of D as:
The next two lemmas prove that D is a nonempty set of linear functionals representing %.
Lemma 5
The linear span of D, denoted by span(D), equals H. D has nonempty algebraic interior in H.
Proof: By monotonicity, the positive orthant H + := ff 2 H : f 0g of H is a subset of D and so span(H + ) span(D). By Lemma 2, H = H + H + which implies that span(H + ) = H and so span(D) = H.
To prove the second assertion, it su¢ ces to show that H + has nonempty topological interior in H. Fix any f 2 H + such that M := minff (s) : s 2 S Z 0 g > 0 and note that the open ball ff 0 2 H : jjf
The next result is due to Shapley and Baucells [19] .
Lemma 6 Let C be a mixture space embedded in a linear space H such that 0 2 C and span(C) = H and let % be a mixture-continuous a¢ ne preorder whose cone D has nonempty algebraic interior in H. Then D is nonempty and for all ;
By Monotonicity, each L 2 D is a positive linear functional. Lemma 5 shows that H + = ff 2 H : f 0g has nonempty topological interior and so each L is a continuous linear functional by a theorem in Schaefer [14, p. 225] .
Since H is a linear subspace of C(S Z
And for every ; Proof: Take a sequence fs n g in S Z 0 converging to s. It is enough to show that s , the Dirac measure on s, belongs to . Fix some % 0 . By Lemma 1, _ 0 2 C and by the construction of %, % 0 if and only if _ 0 . By equation (6.6) , it must be the case that (s n ) = _ 0 (s n ) for all n. The continuity of support functions implies that (s) = _ 0 (s). Conclude that
and so s 2 . To prove the second assertion, take 2 S Z 0 . As argued above, % The following lemma shows that S Z 0 is a local state space for c on Z 0 .
Lemma 8 For every choice problem A 2 Z 0 and x; y 2 A:
Proof: Abusing notation, write x for x j S Z 0 . To see (i), take a set A such that x (s ) < x 0 (s ). Let f n g be a sequence of real numbers converging to 1 and de…ne n := n +(1 n ) 0 . Note that n ! and
To see this, take any s 0 6 = s . For such s 0 , we have
But then fs g equals the Hausdor¤ limit of fD(x; x n )g and so D(x; x n ) must be a subset of any neighborhood of s for n su¢ ciently large.
Lemma 10 If S S Z 0 is another local state space for c on Z 0 , then cl(S) = S Z 0 .
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists s 2 cl(S)nS Z 0 . The case s 2 S Z 0 ncl(S) is analogous. Since S Z 0 is closed there exists an open neighborhood O of s that is disjoint from S Z 0 . Further, s 2 cl(S) implies that O \ S 6 = ?. Take s 0 2 O \ S and x , y as constructed in Lemma 9. But then for any choice problem A 3 x; y:
and
The two implications above are incompatible for A = fx; yg 2 Z 0 .
It remains to prove that c is rationalizable on A for every A 2 K(K( Z)). By Theorem 4, it is enough to show that A is closed under unions and that c satis…es WARP on A . 
Proof of Theorem 2
For each Z 0 2 D, let % Z 0 be the preorder constructed above and let P (S Z 0 ) be the local state space for c on Z 0 . Proceed to show that for all Z 0 Z 00 :
It su¢ ces to show that P (S Z 0 ) t
Z 0 (P (S Z 00 )) \ P Z 0 . By way of contradiction, suppose:
Since P : S Z 0 ! P Z 0 is a homeomorphism, we have:
where
Z 0 (P (S Z 00 )) \ P Z 0 is relatively closed in P Z 0 and so S is closed in S Z 0 . Apply Lemma 9 to …nd menus x y 2 K( Z 0 ) such that:
Since S Z 0 is a local state space, Dominance implies x Z 0 y. Furthermore, if F denotes the …eld on S Z 00 generated by proj Z 0 ( ), then s 7 ! max 2y s is an F-measurable function, whenever y 2 K( Z 0 ). Then x j S = y j S implies that: x j S Z 00 = y j S Z 00 . The su¢ ciency of S Z 00 then implies x Z 00 y in contradiction of Nestedness. Necessity is easily established.
Proof of Theorem 4
Let X be an arbitrary set and let be a collection of subsets of X that is closed under unions. De…ne x % y if x; y 2 c( ) := [ A2 c(A) and there exists a problem A 2 such that x; y 2 A and x 2 c(A). Proceed to show that the binary relation % on c( ) is complete and transitive.
To prove completeness, take x; y 2 c( ) and let A x and A y be the sets such that x 2 c(A x ) and y 2 c(A y ). Without loss of generality suppose that c(A x [ A y ) \ A x 6 = ?. Apply WARP to conclude that x 2 c(A x [ A y ) and so x % y.
To prove transitivity, take x % y % x 0 and let A xy be the set such that x 2 c(A xy ) and y 2 A xy . De…ne Extend % to X as follows: if x; y 2 Xnc( ) set x y; if x 2 c( ) and y 2 Xnc( ) set x y. The extended % is easily seen to be complete and transitive on X.
To prove that % rationalizes c, de…ne c (A) := fx 2 A : x % y 8y 2 Ag for any A 2 . Fix some A and note that by de…nition of %, c(A) c (A). To prove uniqueness, suppose % and % 0 both rationalize c. Take x; y 2 c( ), that is x 2 c(A x ) and y 2 c(A y ) for some A x ; A y 2 , and without loss of generality suppose x % y. But then x 2 c(A x [ A y ) and so x % 0 y.
Proof of Theorem 5
Fix Z 0 2 D and, abusing notation, write for the menu Z 0 . By Theorem 3, there exists a unique preference relation % 0 on K = fx 2 K( Z 0 ) : supp(x) = Z 0 g that rationalizes c on the collection Z 0 . Let %:= cl(% 0 ) denote the closure of % 0 in the product topology on
The following steps establish that % is complete and transitive and rationalizes c on Z 0 .
(i) % is complete. To see this, note that K is dense in K( Z 0 ) and so, for any (x; y) 2 K( Z 0 ) K( Z 0 ), there exists a sequence (x n ; y n ) 2 K K converging to (x; y). The completeness of % 0 implies that x n % 0 y n in…nitely often or y n % 0 x n in…nitely often. The de…nition of % implies that x % y or y % x, as desired.
(ii) 8y 2 K( Z 0 ), the sets fx : x yg and fx : y xg are open. By completeness, fx : x yg is the complement of fx : y % xg in K( Z 0 ). The latter is closed by construction.
(iii) x y implies x % y. The monotonicity of % 0 implies that + ( x and x 2 K if and only if cfx; x g = fxg. Take x x . By (vii), there exists y 2 K such that x y x . For any sequence x n in K converging to x and n large enough, we have cfx n ; y ; x g = fx n g. By Continuity, x 2 cfx; y ; x g. By Consistency, x = 2 cfx; y ; x g. Applying Consistency again gives cfx; x g = fxg. The 'if'part follows from Continuity.
(ix) % is transitive. Take any x; y; y such that x % y % y 0 . That is, there exist sequences (x n ; y n ) ! (x; y) and (b y n ; y x. For all n large enough, step (ii) implies that: b y n % 0 y 0 n 0 x 0 x n % 0 y n .
But then b y n 2 cfb y n ; y 0 n ; x g and x 2 cfx ; x n ; y n g. By Continuity, y 2 cfy; y 0 ; x g and fx g = cfx ; x; yg. But y 0 x and step (viii) imply cfy 0 ; x g = fy 0 g. By Consistency, x = 2 cfy; y 0 ; x g. But then y 2 cfy; y 0 ; x g and x 2 cfx ; x; yg violate Consistency.
(x) % rationalizes c on Z 0 . Take any choice problem A 2 Z 0 , x 2 c(A). Suppose by way of contradiction that 9y 2 A such that y x. By (vii), 9x 2 K such that x x and y x x. By step (viii) and Consistency, x = 2 c(y; x ; x). By Monotonicity, x = 2 c(y; x ; x). But then Consistency implies that x = 2 c(A) which is a contradiction. Suppose next that x % y 8y 2 A. We have to show that x 2 c(A). To see the uniqueness of %, suppose b % is another continuous preference that rationalizes c on Z 0 . Take x % y and a sequence (x n ; y n ) 2 K K converging to (x; y) such that x n % 0 y n 8n. The latter implies that x n b %y n 8n and by the continuity of b %, x b %y. Conversely, take x y. By step (vii), there exists x 2 K such that x x y, implying x b x b y as desired. To complete the proof of the theorem, let S Z 0 be the local state space for c on Z 0 . We have to show that S Z 0 is su¢ cient for %, that is, for all x; y 2 K( Z 0 ), x j S Z 0 = y j S Z 0 implies x y. Suppose by way of contradiction, that x y. Then, step (vii) implies that x [ y x y for some x 2 K . Since % rationalizes c on Z 0 , it follows that cfx [ y; x ; yg = fx [ yg. But x j S Z 0 = y j S Z 0 implies x[y j S Z 0 = y j S Z 0 , contradicting the su¢ ciency of S Z 0 for c on Z 0 . Since S Z 0 satis…es Dominance for c on Z 0 , S Z 0 is the smallest closed set su¢ cient for %. By [4, Theorem 1], % has a weak expected utility representation (S Z 0 ; u Z 0 ).
